Earnings Inequality in India: Has the Rise of Caste and Religion Based Politics in India Had an Impact? * Since 1989, there has been a sharp increase in the role of caste and religion in determining political fortunes at both state and federal levels in India. As a consequence, significant intercaste and inter-religion differences in earnings have the potential to stall the process of economic reforms. Yet, the patterns and determinants of such differences remain unexplored. We address this lacuna in the literature, and explore the determinants of the differences in inter-caste and inter-religion earnings in India during the 1987-99 period, using the 43 rd and 55 th rounds of National Sample Survey (NSS). Our results suggest that (a) earnings differences between "upper" castes and SC/ST have declined between 1987 and 1999, (b) over the same period, earnings differences between Muslims and non-Muslims have increased, to the detriment of the former, and (c) inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings can be explained largely by corresponding differences in educational endowment and returns on age (and, hence, experience). However, differences in returns on education do not explain inter-caste and inter-religion earnings differences to a great extent.
Introduction
The trepidations about the economic reforms in India have given way to optimism, as the economy continues to grow at over 7 percent per annum, despite high oil prices, and despite having successive coalition governments at the central or federal level. Indeed, it is argued that, with the exception of a handful of issues like privatization of state-owned enterprises, there is a broad consensus about the continuation of reforms among political parties across the ideological spectrum. However, there was a strong debate about the possible impact of the (presumably) reforms-driven economic growth on the incidence of poverty.
Specifically, it was argued that the economic growth witnessed in the immediate aftermath of the 1991-92 reforms initiatives had not played a role in reducing poverty. Datt and Ravallion (1997) argued that while the incidence of poverty in India had increased sharply in the immediate aftermath of the macroeconomic crisis of 1991, poverty declined to pre-1991 levels soon after 1991, thereby negating the hypothesis that reforms had brought about a structural break in India's poverty levels. Their argument is consistent with the official statistics released by the Government of India (2001) that suggests that the incidence of poverty declined from 38.9 percent in 1988 to 26.1 percent in 1999, the rate of decline being similar for urban India (38.2 percent to 23.6 percent) and rural India (39.1 percent to 27.1 percent).
However, while research about the extent of poverty reduction in post-1991 India, and the correlates of poverty in the post-1991 period have spawned a literature, 1 there has been very little discussion about the impact of the reforms on earnings inequality in India. The classical literature suggests that economic growth and inequality has an inverted U relationship (Kuznets, 1955) , and that, therefore, some increase in inequality in inevitable during the early stages of economic development. However, it has been argued that inequality is harmful for growth in the long run, especially in democratic political environments, because "it leads to policies that do not protect property rights and do not allow full appropriation of returns from investment" (Persson and Tabellini, 1994, pp. 617) . Hence, it is important to identify sources of income inequality, and to explore the possibilities of reducing the inequality as far as possible, using appropriate policy measures. Deaton and Dreze (2002) argued that while India has traditionally witnessed lower income inequality than many other developing countries, consumption inequality in the country had increased during the 1990s. The increase in inequality might well have been on account of the income of the households in the upper income percentiles during the 1980s and 1990s ( Banerjee and Picketty, 2003) . A detailed study comparing the nature of income inequality of male urban workers during the 1980s and the 1990s found that inequality during the 1980s was driven by unequal distribution of observed skills, whereas inequality during the 1990s was a consequence of unequal returns on observed skills (Kijima, forthcoming) . Related research has explored gender differences in returns to education (e.g., Duraisamy, 2000) .
However, with one exception (Gang, Sen and Yun, 2002) , 2 the existing literature has ignored two oft-discussed aspects of the political economy in India, namely, caste and religion, that have emerged as the cornerstones of India's politics since the late 1980s. While caste has been an integral part of India's social fabric for dozens of centuries, politics in postindependence India was traditionally dominated by the upper castes, especially in the Hindispeaking heartland that account for a majority of the seats in India's Parliament. The adoption of the recommendations of Mandal Commission Report by the Government of India 3 in 1990 triggered events that have led to significant political empowerment of lower castes in India, both at the state/regional and, on account of coalition politics, at the central or federal level. This was accompanied by a sharp polarization of sections of the electorate along religious lines, as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rose to power during the 1990s, using as its tool 2 Their paper explores the determinants of the differential rates of incidence of poverty among scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and non-scheduled castes in India. The main conclusion of the paper is that the underlying reasons for poverty differs across castes. The study takes into consideration neither religion nor the rise of the other backward castes as a political and class entity since 1990. 3 The Mandal Commission, which submitted its report in 1980, re-examined the policy of positive discrimination in favor of lower/backward castes, which was enshrined in the policy to reserve 22.5 percent of all public sector jobs for people belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST). The Commission recommended that the reservation policy be extended to other backward castes (OBC). Specifically, using a 11-point criteria it identified 52 percent of the population as belonging to OBC, and recommended that 27 percent of jobs and seats in educational institutions be reserved for them. The Indian constitution prohibits reservations of more than 50 percent at any institution of employment or education. 4 Since the early 1990s, the SC/ST (including dalits, the lowest of castes) and OBC have voted largely for political parties whose mandate is to lobby for and implement policies that benefit this segment of the electorate. As a consequence, political power in the (erstwhile) states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have shifted to these political parties.
hard line pro-Hindu rhetoric. 5 The political debate of the country has since been redefined, and (anti-) secularism has become the benchmark that defines political parties.
The ability to pursue economic reforms in India, therefore, depends not only on the ability of the government to co-opt various economic classes, especially those that are largely disadvantaged, but also on the distribution of the gains of these reforms across castes and religions. It is easily seen that the emergence of caste and religion-based politics can have a significant impact on inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings. offset by more secular political regimes. The ambiguity is further enhanced by the fact that the federal and state governments might be of different political persuasions.
In deference to this new dynamics in India's political economy, we explore the determinants of the differences in inter-caste and inter-religion earnings in India during the 1987-99 period, using the 43 rd and 55 th rounds of National Sample Survey (NSS). Our results suggest that (a) earnings differences between "upper" castes and SC/ST have declined between 1987 and 1999, (b) over the same period, earnings differences between Muslims and non-Muslims have increased, to the detriment of the former, and (c) inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings can be explained largely by corresponding differences in educational endowment and returns on age (and, hence, experience) . However, differences in returns on education do not explain inter-caste and inter-religion earnings differences to a great extent.
5 The BJP's political ascent began when it emerged as a key coalition partner of the V.P. Singh government that took oath of office in 1989. When the Congress party came back to power in 1991, the BJP chose as its political strategy the endorsement of a hard line pro-Hindu ideology. The most memorable act associated with this pro-Hindu rhetoric was the demolition of the Babri mosque in Uttar Pradesh in December 1992. Since then, the BJP and its coalition partners were in power at the federal level for more than half of the time. At the state level, it has emerged as either the party in power or the key contender in (erstwhile) Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the data. The prima facie evidence about inter-caste and inter-religion earnings differences are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we formally decompose inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings. Section 5 concludes.
Data
We use Indian National Sample Survey employment-unemployment data for the urban sector for the years 1987 and 1999, i.e belonging to all these non-Hindu and non-Muslim religions and categorise them as "other".
INSERT Table 1 about here.
To begin with, let us compare the earnings of the different castes and religious groups both during a time period and across time. We have defined earnings to include all types of wages and salaries and income in kind (Yang, 2005) , and all earnings are expressed in 1999 prices.
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The data suggest the following: However, it is interesting to note that individuals belonging to the "other" religions 7 Note that all people who declare castes are, by definition, Hindus because other religions do not have a built-in caste system. Hence, an inter-caste comparison of earnings is essentially an intra-Hindu analysis. This will hold true for the rest of this analysis. Muslims, 21 percent of whom had tertiary education, were less educated, on average than both Hindus (35 percent) and other non-Hindus (40 percent).
In the next section, we explore in some detail the nature of earnings inequality across castes and religions in India, and changes in the patterns of inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings between 1987 and 1999.
Earnings inequality
To begin with, we take a look at the differences, if any, in the distributions of real earnings of the various castes and religions. The kernel distributions for these earnings are presented in Nevertheless, Figure 1 is instructive, and indicates that the earnings distributions for all castes are skewed towards the lower tail. This is consistent with the fact that despite a high growth rate since the 1990s, the per capita GDP of India continues to be less than USD 700 per annum. It also indicates that a much higher proportion of the SC/ST (and, in 1999, also OBC) individuals were in the lower earnings categories than those belonging to the "upper" castes.
It is interesting to note, however, that while the "upper" castes have a greater proportion of their people in the middle earnings groups than the "lower" castes, there is no discernible difference in the upper tails of the earnings distributions of the various castes. Next, by way of Figure 3 , we compare inter-caste and inter-religion differences in (log real) earnings for each earnings decile, for 1987 and 1999. In lie between these extremes work in formal or quasi-formal enterprises and the education they have are of heterogeneous quality. Hence, it is possible for a graduate of commerce from a reputed university to get a job as a bank official, thereby gaining access to a fairly substantial salary and associated perks, while someone with a degree in humanities from a relatively unknown university may end up working as a clerk at a small private enterprise, earning an income that is barely enough for survival.
The implications of this scenario are twofold: (i) The difference in earnings would be low across castes and religions for individuals with very low and very high levels of education, 9 In panel (a), we measure on the vertical axis log earnings of other castes less the log earnings of SC/ST. In panel (b), we measure on that axis log earnings of Hindus less log earnings of Muslims. 10 In panel (c), we measure on the vertical axis log earnings of Hindus less the log earnings of "other" religious groups. In panel (d), we measure on that axis log earnings of Muslims less log earnings of "other" religious groups.
9 and much higher in the intermediate range of education.
(ii) The relatively high earnings differential around the median level of earnings could be on account of differences in observed factors such as proportion of people belonging to various castes and religions with a certain level of education, and also on account of differences in unobserved factors that yield different rates of return on education for people belonging to different castes and religions.
INSERT Table 2 about here.
The mean earnings of people with different educational endowments, and belonging to different castes and religions, are reported in Table 2 . It can easily be seen that earnings unambiguously increase with level of education, for all castes and religions, and for both the years. This strong positive correlation between education level and earnings suggests that earnings differentials across castes and religions are likely to be influenced significantly by inter-caste and inter-religion differences in educational endowment.
However, it is not obvious as to whether inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings can be explained by differences in the returns to education across castes and religions. As highlighted in the aforementioned scenario, differences in returns to education are most likely to be observed for people with intermediate levels of education. Hence, if these returns are an important determinant of earnings differentials, after controlling for the level of education, then earnings differentials should be the lowest for the illiterate and professionals, and much higher for people with intermediate levels of education. However, it is evident from Table 2 that this is not the case. For example, in 1999, there was virtually no difference between the earnings of illiterate other (or "upper") castes and their illiterate SC/ST counterparts, and the corresponding difference between earnings of people belonging to these two castes with secondary education was 21 percent. But, the difference between the professionals belonging to these two castes was 37 percent.
INSERT Figure 4 about here.
In order to facilitate a comparison of differences in (log) earnings between castes and religions, across educational cohorts, we use Figure 4 . Panels (c) and (d) Muslims had increased over the same period (with the exception of professionals). This is consistent with the findings reported in Figures (3a) and (3b), and Table 2 .
Our analysis thus far suggests that inter-caste differences were declining between 1987 and 1999 while inter-religion differences were rising. There is once again evidence to suggest that education is likely to explain, at least in part, differences in earnings across castes and religions. To reiterate, while differences in levels of educational endowment almost certainly explain part of differences in earnings, it is not evident as to whether differences in returns on education play a role as well. Hence, we require a more formal decomposition of the intercaste and inter-religion differences in earnings, and these are reported in the following section.
Decomposition analysis

Earnings equation
In this section, we report the findings from a formal decomposition analysis of inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings. For the purposes of the decomposition analysis, we model (log) earnings as a variant form of the stylised Mincerian equation: In a traditional Mincer equation, log earnings is assumed to be a function of experience. This is typically measured as age of an individual less the sum of the number of years of schooling and five. However, our data do not provide information about the number of years of schooling, and any attempt to generate years of experience from the age of an individual would lead to measurement error. Since experience is a linear monotonic transformation of age, we retain the latter in the specification, instead of approximating the former. 12 All the states of the north east, each of which individually accounts for a tiny proportion of the labour force and economic activity in India, have been clubbed together. Delhi is the omitted category.
allows the rate of return to vary across types of education level, which is consistent with the relevant literature (Heckman, Layne-Farrar and Todd, 1996; Münich, Svejnar and Terrell, 2005) .
INSERT Table 3 about here.
The above Mincer equation is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), and appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that the standard errors are robust. 14 The regression coefficients are reported in Table 3 . Note that, in order to enable comparison between 1987
and 1999, we estimated the model for non-SC/ST castes, for 1999, in two different ways.
First, as reported in Table 2 , we estimated the model separately for SC/ST, OBC and other (i.e., "higher") castes. We then re-estimated the model for the non-SC/ST castes by pooling together the individuals belonging to the OBC and other (i.e., "higher") castes.
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The regression results suggest the following:
1. Earnings have a quadratic relationship with age for all castes, and for Hindus, in both 1987 and 1999 ; earnings initially increase with age, and decreases once an average individual reaches about 40 years of age. This is also true for "other" (non-Hindu) religions for 1999. However, ceteris paribus earnings of Muslims increase monotonically with age. Such a monotonically increasing relationship was also observed for people belonging to "other" religions in 1987. While an inverted-U relationship between age and earnings is certainly not true for public sector employees and skilled labourers employed in the private sector, the result is an indicator of the strong impact of employees in quasi-organised sectors (e.g., retail trade, construction) on the aggregate profile of labourers in India.
2. In keeping with stylised results, women experienced lower earnings than men in both 1987 and 1999, and the negative impact was particularly high for Muslim women. 13 The industries are as follows: mining; food manufacturing; textiles; leather; wood and wood products, paper and publishing; chemical, plastic, rubber; non-metallic mineral products; basic metal products; machinery and equipment; electrical and electronic machinery, and medical Instrument; transport and communication; utilities; construction; wholesale and retail trade; finance and insurance; and other. 14 The use of OLS is fairly stylised and has been used by Kijima (forthcoming), among others. A defence for the use of OLS, as opposed to a Heckman-type model, can be found in Münich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005, pp . 283) and Puhani (2000) . 15 The latter regression, whose estimates have been used for the decomposition reported later in the paper, has not been reported on account of brevity, and can be provided by the authors upon request.
Marriage, however, had a positive impact on earnings. This can be explained by saying that marriage expands an individual's social network, thereby providing her with greater economic opportunities. Alternatively, in the presence of dual income families, and greater access to inter household private transfers, marriage can enable an individual to absorb higher search costs, leading to a higher paid occupation.
3. Not surprisingly, education and earnings were positively related to each other; the positive impact of education was evident as early as primary education. The relationship between these two variables was exponential in both 1987 and 1999. However, by 1999, the returns to all levels of education had declined somewhat.
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Returns to education were, by and large, lower for SC/ST and Muslims relative to other (i.e., "upper") castes and non-Muslims, respectively.
The OLS models had R-square values in the 0.45-0.55 range, and the associated F-and tstatistics also suggested that the specification fit the data for each sub-sample quite well.
Oaxaca decomposition
Next, we use the coefficient estimates estimated for the Mincer equations to decompose the inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings into familiar endowment (or characteristics) and coefficient effects. Specifically, we use the stylised algorithm proposed by Oaxaca (1973) . The Oaxaca decomposition algorithm suggests the following:
where E ln is the predicted mean (log) earning; h and l refer to the groups with higher and lower earnings, respectively; X is the mean vector of earning determining variables (human capital variables or endowments variable ); is vector of the estimated returns to the earning βˆ 16 Returns to education might have increased significantly for a small fraction of the labour force who are employed in sectors like software and financial services. However, given that our categories are somewhat broad brush -e.g., professionals can include both software engineers working at multinational corporations and (say) mechanical engineers working at low growth traditional industries -it is perfectly plausible for an average individual in each of these education categories to have a lower return on education in 1999 than in 1987.
13 determinants; and the last term indicates the interaction effect. 17 The characteristics and coefficient effects associated with the key variables are reported in Tables 4 and 5.   18 INSERT Tables 4 and 5 about here.
In the first column of The results reported in Table 4 accounted for by differences in the returns to education between these two caste groups. To the extent that the coefficient effect captures discriminatory behaviour, therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that either in 1987 or in 1999 there was any discrimination along caste lines.
• In 1987, differences in returns on age, and hence, presumably, experience, accounted for about 23 percent of the difference in the log earnings of SC/ST and the other 17 Our decomposition assumes that the high earnings group is the reference or "no discrimination" group, such that the explained component of the decomposition comprises of the endowment effect and the interaction effect, while the unexplained component includes only the coefficients effect. See Oaxaca (1973) for details. 18 The identification problem in Oaxaca decomposition regarding the coefficient effect of the intercept and dummy variable due to the choice of reference category, as mentioned by Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) and Yun (2005) , has been dealt with by using devcon command in STATA which used to transform the coefficients of such 0/1 dummy variables so that they reflect deviations from the "grand mean" (in other words, the modified coefficients will sum up to zero over all categories) rather than deviations from the reference category.
castes (first column). The corresponding figure for 1999 was about 44 percent (second column). Given that returns to age and, therefore, experience are associated with the extent to which a person is upwardly mobile, this result precipitates a discussion about the role of glass ceilings in affecting earnings potential of some castes.
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The decomposition results reported in Table 5 indicate that the differences in (log) earnings between the Muslims and the non-Muslims rose between 1987 and 1999, explained to a significant extent the differences in log earnings between Muslims and "other" (non-Hindu) religions, while the associated coefficient effect remained weak.
• The coefficient effect associated with age (and, hence, experience) continued to be large. In 1987, this effect accounted for 166 percent of the difference in log earnings between Hindus and Muslims, and 218 percent of the difference in log earnings of Hindus and "other" religions, in both cases in favour of the Hindus. The corresponding figures for 1999 were 181 percent and 106 percent, in favour of the Hindus and people of the "other" religion, respectively. In the same year, the coefficient effect associated with age accounted for 149 percent of the difference in log earnings between Muslims and the "other" religions, in favour of the latter. There is some evidence, in other words, that age and experience contributed to upward 19 Note, for example, that the coefficient effect of age plays a major role in explaining the (small) difference in log earnings of OBC and SC/ST in 1999 (see third column in Table 4 ). To recapitulate, during the 1990s, the emergence of the OBC political parties, which have been in positions of power and patronage both at the state level in the "Hindi" belt, as also at the federal level by way of coalitions, have been more meteoric than the rise in the political fortunes of the SC/ST. Hence, it is plausible that the pro-OBC coefficient effect of age in 1999 is a reflection of fewer glass ceilings for OBC.
socio-economic mobility of people belonging to "other" religions between 1987 and 1999 , but the Muslims were unable to benefit from similar socio-economic movements.
Interestingly, even though the unobserved effects associated with the constant term are relatively small for inter-caste differences in log earnings, these effects are large for interreligion differences in the same. At best, we can hazard a guess about the nature of these unobserved effects, and these might reflect factors such as social norms that have implications for mobility and networks that often have an impact on returns to characteristics.
The policy implications for these results are not straightforward. To begin with, they suggest that differences in educational endowment, as opposed to differences in returns on education, play an important role in determining differences in both inter-caste and inter-religion earnings. In other words, the ability of the government to reduce these differences by effecting laws that promote non-discrimination along lines of caste and religion, or even positive discrimination in favour of certain castes and religions is limited. At the same time, while the government can promote education by way of appropriate levels of investment, and while it can encourage people to educate themselves and their family members, in a democratic context, its role is limited and perhaps even secondary to the role of socioeconomic forces that shape the decisions of individuals and households.
The government can perhaps play a bigger role in the context of the coefficients effect associated with age, to the extent that this effect reflects glass ceilings for some castes and religions that are a manifestation of discrimination. However, ceteris paribus, the higher returns to age and, hence, experience, for some of the castes and religions than those accruing to others might also reflect factors like choice of career paths (e.g., technocrat vs. managerial executive) and private social networks over which the government has little control.
Nevertheless, this is an issue that demands a more in-depth look, and should be revisited by researchers in the future.
Concluding remarks
The Indian economy has attracted a lot of attention in the recent years, largely on account of its high rate of growth. Since the mid 1990s, there has been some evaluation of the impact on poverty of the market-oriented reforms that presumably caused this growth. However, a serious analysis of inequality, especially as it is reflected in inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings, is conspicuous by its absence. At the same time, however, the rise of caste and religion as political forces in India since 1989 sharpened the possibility that noticeable inequality across castes and religions would slow down economic reforms considerably, to the detriment of economic growth. Hence, a thorough examination of intercaste and inter-religion differences in earnings, and the patterns and determinants of these differences is imperative, and our paper aims to address this lacuna in the literature.
Using NSS data for about 30,000 individuals for both 1987 and 1999 , we examine these differences in a variety of ways. Our analysis confirms the popular wisdom that the "upper" castes are better off, on average, than SC/ST and OBC. We also find that Hindus are better off than the Muslims, while those belonging to "other" religions are better off than the Hindus. While the inter-caste differences in earnings declined between 1987 and 1999, there was an increase in the differences in the earnings of Muslims and non-Muslims, in favour of the latter. Our analysis further suggests that inter-caste and inter-religion differences in educational endowment and the returns to age (and, hence, experience) explain much of the corresponding differences in (log) earnings. However, from the coefficient effects of education, there is no evidence in favour of caste-or religion-based discrimination. The policy implications for our results are discussed in Section 4.
An important shortcoming of our paper is our inability to take into consideration the selfemployed individuals who constitute as much as 40 percent of the work force in urban India. This is on account of unavailability of earnings data for all but a handful of the self-employed respondents. This is what forced Kijima (forthcoming), for example, to restrict his sample to urban workers who were employed at formal sector organisations. However, given the reasonable assumption that a self-employed person in urban India is more likely to be at the lower end of income distribution than at the upper end, their omission from the sample makes it difficult to forcefully discuss the government's policy options in ameliorating the effects of earnings inequality. The exclusion of the self-employed people from the sample also affects an analysis of inter-caste and inter-religion differences in earnings because Muslims, SC/ST and OBC are over-represented in the sample of self-employed individuals. Collection of better data on these individuals, to facilitate research with greater policy implications, therefore, remains an important future endeavour. 
